RHS 201

11th Assignment

Read Tindall & Shi, Chapters 11 & 15, Chapters 19, 20, 21 below. Read and submit a resume on the article "John C. Calhoun: The Marx of the Master Class." which follows below..

CHAPTER 19. THE AGE OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY

WHAT WAS JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY

The election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, inaugurated a period of American history in which the pattern and tempo of politics changed dramatically. Most visibly, that election saw a major shift in political power, from East to West. Prior to 1828, the state of Virginia had dominated the Executive branch, producing 4 of the six presidents. Massachusetts produced the other two. Jackson was from Tennessee, a state beyond the Appalachian mountains. Henceforth, the West was increasingly to hold the balance of power between the North and the South.

But Jackson was also the first president to be called "the people's president," and the first to receive a nick-name by the public. "Old Hickory" was a moniker first given Jackson by his

soldiers, who saw in him a toughness which the public then attributed to his early life on the frontier. This was then translated into a new model of the self-made American.

A soldier, horse trader, land speculator and frontier lawyer, frequent participant in brawls and duels, Jackson was born in a log cabin, and made it to the white house. No previous occupant of

that mansion could make that claim. Many afterwards sought to make it. Some did, by generously shading the truth. And, in addition, Jackson was a national military hero, the victor at the Battle of New Orleans. Thus he was immediately identified with the new wave of nationalist feeling which that war produced.

But the real movement behind Jacksonian Democracy, has little todo with Andrew Jackson. Unlike Jefferson who bequeathed a body of political and social doctrine, Jacksonian Democracy has little to do with ideology. Rather, it has to due with the upsurge of voter participation, with the expansion of the suffrage underway since the states carved out of the Trans-Appalachian region had dropped their property qualifications. This in turn brought pressure on

the eastern states to follow suit. Between 1812 and 1821, six new Western states had entered the Union with constitutions providing for universal male suffrage. Their liberality in this regard was

due largely to the desire to stimulate rapid immigration during their territorial stage of development. In turn, this had brought pressure in the older, Eastern states to adopted the same policies in order to slow down emigration from their region. By 1828, universal, white male suffrage was becoming the rule, not the exception in both the North and the West.

And with that expansion of the suffrage came a new set of assumptions by the voters. No longer deferential to the old aristocracy of either birth or talent, the new voters identified

with their own - and Jackson was definitely one of them. In the new political climate, the worst label to be saddled with when seeking office, was that of "aristocrat." Jackson, although hardly

a "common man," was untouchable by this slander.

The expansion of the suffrage also brought into existence a new type of politician, the professional politician; one whose activities were devoted strictly to devising strategy, mobilizing

votes, and finding candidates acceptable to the masses. By 1828, none of the state electors were selected by the state legislatures.

All were named by the people at the ballot box. This apparently small change in choosing electors touched off the greatest change in politics since the election of 1796. For it was clear to all

knowledgeable observers that victory belonged to that faction or party, which could lead the majority of voters to the polls, casting their votes for electors who were obliged to cast their

ballots as instructed - by the people.

To mobilize this vote required the full time activities of professional politicians, the new technicians of mass leadership - the stump politicians. These were the men who brought with them a new grab-bag of instruments: party discipline, the partisan press, patronage and the spoils system.

It was a coterie of such new political pros that converged on the figure of Andrew Jackson in 1824, men such as Felix Grundy, Martin Van Buren, Amos Kendall and William B. Lewis. Four years later, with Jackson installed in the White House, these men would be called the "Kitchen

Cabinet, due to their dominant influence over executive policy coupled with their alleged tendency to meet in the White House kitchen where they discussed policy over bourbon and branch water in the evening hours. (neither attribute being entirely true.)

In its most simplistic sense, politics becomes a battle between the "ins" and the "outs." The election of 1828 had been waged on personalities, not issues, between the "ins" and the "outs." Those who attacked the Adams/Clay faction of "National Republicans," had been united largely by their agreement on Jackson as their candidate. Little else held them together. The dominant

personalities at the beginning of the administration were John C. Calhoun and Martin Van Buren.

The former, although Vice President under John Q. Adams, saw his aspirations for president doomed by the "corrupt bargain," which made Henry Clay next in line to succeed Adams. Since Clay was the new heir apparent of Adams, Calhoun accepted the bait tossed out by Jackson's backers who assured him that Old Hickory, then aged 62, had one foot on in the grave and the other foot on a banana peel. It was too tempting to refuse. Calhoun came over as Jackson's

running mate in 1828 determined to emerge as Old Hickory's heir apparent.

These were the men who had tapped the newly enfranchised voters, and merged them with the disaffected remnants of Thomas Jefferson's old Democratic/Republican Party. It was a volatile mix. But Jacksonian Democracy was, and since has been, a volatile brew.

But, what attracted the majority of voters? Obviously, a "popular candidate." And here is where Jackson fit the needs of the hour. In background, in temperament, and most of all, in

image, Jackson became the candidate with that indispensable charisma that attracted voters.

It also became apparent to all close observers of the new political climate, that it was indispensable to avoid the major issues of the day. Issues divide. People take sides on the

issues. A candidate who therefore takes a stand on any issue is one who alienates potential voters. Therefore, any candidate, and any party hoping to mobilize the majority of voters, avoided taking a stand, generally by waxing loud on principles and catering to the

lowest common denominator among the electorate.

THE PARTISAN IMPULSE: THE BANK WAR

One final aspect of Jacksonian Democracy is apparent. The political issues of the day had to be handled, not on the basis of their merit, but on the basis of partisan advantage. With each

party forced to find the lowest common denominator on which to appeal to the voters, politicians weighed each issue before them for their impact at the polls rather than for their substantive

merit. This tendency is well reflected in the handling of the bank issue, which appeared at the close of Jackson's first administration.

As noted earlier, the Bank of the United States (or the 2nd BUS, as historians call it) was chartered in 1816 in response to the disastrous government financing accompanying the War of 1812. Thoroughly Hamiltonian in concept, the 2nd BUS had been modeled closely upon the original Bank of the United States.

Judged strictly on its merits, there was little about that bank to warrant criticism. With its headquarters in Philadelphia, the 2nd BUS had branch offices in every state, which gave it a

commanding presence. It made about one fifth of the bank loans and stored about one third of all specie deposits of the nation in its vault. Thus it dominated, but hardly monopolize the banking

operations of the country.

In addition to holding government revenues and handling government obligations, the 2nd BUS served as a true central bank. It informally regulated the currency and credit of smaller banks

throughout the nation, thus preventing inflation by private banks whose inclination was to over-issue paper money. This influence derived from the fact that, being truly national, and having sizable specie deposits at hand, the 2nd BUS kept the smaller, state chartered banks from over-issuing their bank notes. Those private banks that did, well knew that the 2nd BUS could at any moment demand redemption in specie for their notes held by that central bank.

As of 1832, the President of the 2nd BUS was Nicholas Biddle. The scion of a distinguished and wealthy Philadelphia family; witty, urbane, cultivated, intelligent, Biddle was a Princeton

graduate at the age of fifteen. Widely traveled in Europe, he was something of an authority on Greek culture. He also wrote the first standard account of the Lewis and Clark expedition.

Unfortunately for both Biddle and the Bank, these characteristics were those considered to be "aristocratic" in an age of the common man. In today's political climate, we would call them "elitist."

One other liability was carried in the baggage of the 2nd BUS. Biddle was a National Republican, a supporter of the Adams/Clay faction between 1824 and 1828 when the two party system emerged. Thus to the Jacksonians in the White House, Biddle was immediately

suspect as - the enemy. Members of the kitchen cabinet well recognize the latent hostility toward the BUS. In the West, small farmers still bitterly detested the role of the BUS in responding

to the Panic of 1819. In the South, small planters carried the same sentiments. Many had experienced bankruptcy during the course of that depression as the central bank curtailed the money supply and called in loans.

One other group hostile to the central bank emerged during the 1820's - the banking community of New York City. By 1830, New York was emerging and the largest commercial and financial center of the country, having surpassed Philadelphia after the War of 1812. And as the principal port, New York saw the largest portion of customs duties collected from the tariff, pass through its portals. Unfortunately, for New York bankers, these funds did not remain in New York banks, but were paid over to the government's account in the 2nd Bank of the United States in Philadelphia. This left New York banks with smaller reserves, which meant fewer dollars to lend

to expansion minded businessmen.

And not only in New York was this true, but in the other port cities of the United States. Boston, Baltimore and Charleston reflected the same sentiment among their respective banking

communities. Local business leaders in those cities were constantly reminded by their bankers that the high interest rates charged them was due to their depleted reserves - thanks to the 2nd

BUS.

Fortunately for these private bankers, they now had friends in the new administration of Andrew Jackson. "Old Kinderhook," as Martin Van Buren was called, was particularly sensitive to the

criticism of his New York constituents. So was Amos Kendall of Kentucky. Kendall had taken part in the Kentucky Bank War of 1819, where he had championed debtor relief laws during the Panic of 1819. Add to the list the name of Roger B. Taney of Baltimore Maryland, whose own bank in that city had long been a critic of the 2nd BUS. The historian has no difficulty in imaging this group calling Jackson's attention to 2nd BUS, contrasting the aristocratic, polished, cultivated and urban Nicholas Biddle with the credit-hungry small businessman struggling to "make good" in

the new business world, just as the president had "made good" in his career.

Thus with the election of 1832 approaching, the right ingredients came percolating through the filter of Jacksonian Democracy to make the future of the 2nd BUS the center piece in the

upcoming presidential election. The Bank was about to become a "Monster." Jackson was about to become the dragon slayer.

Given the "corrupt bargain" of 1824 in which Adams had designated Henry Clay as his heir apparent, it was a given that Clay would be a strong contender for the nomination of the National

Republicans. And, as a strong friend of the 2nd BUS (Clay was on retainer by Biddle as the Bank's attorney), it was a foregone conclusion that Clay would seek to enlist that powerful institution in support of his presidential aspirations. Thus, when in 1832 Henry Clay introduced a bill in Congress seeking to re-charter the Bank for another 20 years, the partisan implications were obvious to all. The current charter of the 2nd BUS did not expire until 1836. The current effort by Clay, four years before the deadline, and during an election year, could have only one meaning.

The rechartering bill passed the Senate by a vote of 28 to 20, reflecting the less-than-unanimous consensus of the country at large as to the Bank's desirability. Moreover, most of the votes

against the recharter measure came from the South and South-West, regions which reflected strong resenting during the floor debate in that chamber.

The day after the Senate vote, Martin Van Burn found Jackson lying on a couch in the White House, looking pale. "The bank, Mr. Van Buren, is trying to kill me," the president said. "but I will kill it." And kill it he did, with a veto, accompanied by a message outlining his reasons.

Jackson's veto message was the first in American history. Former presidents had exercised this power of disallowance, but none had gone public with an explanation. Jackson's veto message

was crafted with an eye toward the upcoming 1832 campaign. It was also the first time a President had taken a public stand on a major issue by challenging the voters to approve or disapprove of his decision at the polls.

The president's denunciation of the rechartering bill ranged from an allegation that the bank was a threat to national security to the charge that it was a monopolistic tool of the aristocrats.

It also, in a throw back to the strict constructionist principles of Jeffersonian Democracy, charged that institution with being unconstitutional.

Thus in a masterful stroke of partisan politics, Jackson's veto message (actually the work of Amos Kendall who drafted it) united five important block of voters for the up-coming election: wall street bankers, jealous of the dominance of the Central bank, northern businessmen who opposed the 2nd BUS's restraint on credit; advocates of state's rights and restricted federal government, agrarians distrustful of banks in general, and the newly enfranchised voters who identified bankers with "the aristocracy."

Nicholas Biddle proved his ineptness in the new political arena by failing to recognize popular sentiment. Although recognizing the partisan nature of the attack, Biddle anticipated the public

would respond favorably to his careful, and somewhat learned explanations of the vital role played by a Central Bank. Having read Jackson's veto message, Biddle financed publication and

distribution of it, anticipating the public would see it for the piece of demagogic nonsense it was. As one historians expressed it, "The picture he (Biddle) presents is that of Little Lord

Fauntleroy, lace on his skirt and good in his heart, running into those rough boys down the alley."

The decision by the National Republicans to nominate John Sergeant of Pennsylvania as Clay's running mate, sealed the matter. Sergeant was general counsel to the 2nd BUS and chief strategist

behind its rechartering efforts. Unfortunately for Clay, he was not consulted in the selection of his running mate. The political winds of change were blowing too fast for consultation.

In 1832, a third party made an unwelcome appearance on the national scene - the Anti-Masonic Party. Like the Democratic Party which appeared in 1828, the Anti-Masonic party was the product of the general upsurge of newly enfranchised voters, emerging out of a popular hostility toward the Masonic Order. Although opposition to a fraternal order hardly appears to be the foundation stone upon which politics can be established, the Anti-Masonic party rode the

tide of democracy by initiating three innovations. First, it became the first "Third Party" to challenge the two party system. Second, it was the first to hold a national nominating convention

consisting of delegates chosen directly "by the people." And finally, it was the first to adopt a party platform.

The spontaneous, and apparent success of the Anti-Masonic movement caused both the National and Democratic Republicans to follow suit. Eager to ride the tide, the National Republicans announced they would hold a national convention. The Democratic Republicans followed suit in order to demonstrate popular for Jackson.

The outcome of the election of 1832 was a solid, if not ringing endorsement of President Jackson. Old Hickory received 688,000 popular votes to Clay's 530,000. William Wirt, the candidate of the Anti-Masonic Party received only a few thousand popular votes. Like many a candidate since, Wirt discovered that the two party system is particularly adept at taking the wind out of the sales of any Third Party.

Not surprising, Jackson interpreted his victory as a mandate to destroy "The Monster." The fate of the 2nd BUS thus fell victim to the partisan struggles in the political climate created by the tide of Jacksonian Democracy. The sequel will be examined later.

THE PARTISAN IMPULSE: THE PEGGY EATON SCANDAL

Even social life in Washington could not escape the partisan prism of the new democratic impulses during the first Jackson administration. Thus the scandal surrounding the marriage of one Peggy O'Neil to John Eaton became a burning political issue, indeed, a veritable "malaria" as Martin Van Buren characterized it.

Sweet Peggy O'Neil was the daughter of an Inn Keeper in Washington, and according to all accounts, a most attractive young lady who tended bar in her father's establishment. Married to a

purser in the U.S. Navy, who was frequently called away on duty, young Peggy was the object of considerable attention from the young bachelors who, then as now, frequented the District's watering holes.

Among those attracted to the O'Neil establishment was Senator John Eaton of Tennessee. A relationship developed. Peggy was 19 years old at the time and Eaton was 42. A few eyebrows had been raised, but apparently the relationship was, as society phrased it, "discreet." Then fortune smiled upon the loving couple. Peggy's husband died on board ship in the Mediterranean, leaving her a widow. John Eaton decided to make an "honest woman" out of his new love, and married her. Three months later, John Eaton was installed in Jackson's cabinet as Secretary of War.

The recent marriage unfortunately did not make an "honest woman" out of Peggy in the eyes of the other cabinet member's wives. They deliberately shunned Peggy on the frequent social occasions in which she accompanied her husband. In the view of these older ladies it became obvious that Peggy was the sow's ear, out of which there was no possibility of crafting the proverbial silk purse.

Not surprisingly, these incidents became the subject of the titillating gossip that flows from the White House during every administration. Peggy became the object of not a few rumors and

jokes from Congressmen, most of whom were in the ranks of the National Republic opposition. The most notorious rumor was that Peggy's former husband had committed suicide upon learning of his wife's philanderings with Eaton. These jokes, innuendos and rumors filtered back to Jackson's ears where they struck a raw nerve.

Jackson himself had been the subject of such a personal attack arising out of his marriage to a woman, not quite legally divorced at the time of their union. In the election of 1828, the National

Republicans had accused Jackson of adultery. His own wife being deceased, Jackson internalized the charge since it contained a technical element of truth.

Chivalrous to a fault, Jackson thus extended every hospitality to Peggy and John Eaton on the social circuit and encouraged his cabinet to do likewise. Only one responded as directed. Martin Van Buren, a widower, displayed his loyalty by following directions from the President. The rest of the cabinet obeyed instructions from their wives. At length Peggy's ostracism became so complete that she simply declined the pro forma invitations.

Jackson became incensed. The whole affair was, in his mind, nothing more or less than an attempt on the part of the opposition party to smear his administration. Having fumed over the scandal for months, and failing to convert most of the cabinet to order their wives to accept the young Peggy, Jackson decided upon firmer action. The president called a cabinet meeting where, it was announced, evidence as to Peggy's virtue would be openly discussed. The meeting was held, the cabinet was silent (not to say embarrassed), and at its conclusion, President Andrew Jackson declared Peggy O'Neil to be "as chaste as a virgin." He then virtually order his cabinet to extend the "appropriate" display of hospitality to her.

The whole incident, of course, fueled the rumor mill of Washington, to the glee of Clay and the National Republicans. Peggy, they declared, had obviously been "chased" - but not as a

virgin. Nor did the cabinet member's wives show any inclination to following the presidential decision. Peggy's exclusion from high society was complete and total.

Jackson, ever fuming and as ever convinced that the entire episode stemmed from the partisan efforts of the National Republicans, was now open for suggestions. Ever so slowly, the

wily Martin Van Buren, who alone had shown his loyalty to the President by extending every courtesy to the Eatons, brought it to the attention of the President that apparently Mrs. John C. Calhoun was at the center of the Peggy's ostracism. And with Jackson's attention drawn to the person of his Vice President, we can be sure that Old Kinderhook gently reminded the president of Calhoun's recent defection from the Adams/Clay faction and the possible re-defection back to that faction. And we can be sure that Old Kinderhook brought to the president's attention that much earlier, during the Monroe administration, Calhoun had, in the capacity of Secretary of War, attempted to have Jackson court martialed.

The fire had been lit in the mind of Old Hickory. At last, an explanation that satisfied the president had been made. It was Calhoun - John C. Calhoun, who was the source and inspiration of the scandal. Calhoun was in league with the National Republicans, feeding them with gossip and, through his wife, creating the intolerable situation. Or so the President concluded. A nail was thus hammered in the coffin of the presidential expectations of John C.Calhoun. Coupled with the outcome of the Nullification Crisis of 1832, Calhoun's coffin was to be sealed. By 1836, Calhoun had lost Jackson's support and resigned from the administration. And the new heir apparent of Old Hickory was, not surprisingly, Martin Van Buren.

CHAPTER 20. THE EMERGENCE OF A SECTIONAL ALIGNMENT

THE TARIFF ISSUE

The period of American history over which Andrew Jackson presided (1829-1836) was the most dynamic and stimulating era yet produced, one in which currents unleashed by the influx of a new generation of voters coupled with the dynamics of a rising entrepreneurial class at the same time that a moral fervor swept the country. To many it was a bewildering phenomenon. To others, however, there was given a remarkably astute sense of understanding of the new forces.

Sectional issues: banks, tariffs, internal improvements and western lands dominated the political landscape, producing a clear sectional alignment among the three sections: North, West

and South, that foreshadowed the rupture of the Union that would eventually produce the Civil War. Let us first of all, trace the outline of those issues and then put them into the perspective of

a contemporary observer, John C. Calhoun, and draw the portrait of the future that he did.

The most persistent issue to emerge during this era was that of the protective tariff. Between 1816 and 1828, Calhoun and other southern spokesmen had watched their section evolve

politically from the dominant region of the union, professing the most ardent nationalism, to a minority section of a sprawling republic in which foreign immigration was increasing the

political strength of the North while western expansion was shifting the balance of national power to the West. At the same time, as the producer of traditional staples (low valued goods),

the South was becoming enmeshed in a neo-mercantile system in which it imported manufactured goods (high-valued goods) from Europe and the factories of the North.

The awareness of this sectional pathology was especially acute in the state of South Carolina which Calhoun represented. Following the War of 1812, Calhoun had voted for the moderately

protective tariff of 1816, in the expectation that the available supply of cotton, coupled with an abundant supply of waterpower and slave labor would produce in the South a thriving textile

industry. Yet, by 1828, it was apparent to all that South Carolina was not to become industrialized. Competent managers were hard to come by, Yankee managers proved unable to adapt slave labor from the fields to the mills; capital failed to flow into the region and the cotton triangular trade prevented any domestic accumulation of surplus wealth.

Worse yet, South Carolina remained stationary in her population following the War of 1812 while her economy began a slow decline, not only in relation to the North, but in relation

to her sister states of the region. Soil exhaustion and the wasteful, land destroying effects of the cotton culture set in, and the more enterprising planters emigrated to the new lands of

the South-West - Alabama, Mississippi, and the Mexican province of Texas.

By 1828 there had been created just that atmosphere of pride, downward mobility and resentment on the part of the ruling plantation aristocracy in South Carolina which had bred

secessionist movements in New England during the War of 1812. Then in 1828, the fuse was lit to the tinder box when a group of