RHS 201
Twelvth Assignment
Read text, Chapters 21 and 22 below, Tindall & Shi, Chapter 14, from the Davis book, "The Northern Response to Slavery" (Resume due on this article.
CHAPTER 21. AN ISSUE CALLED TEXAS
BACKGROUND
The historical nitch which John Tyler attempted to carve out for himself, floundered upon the issue of Texas, which was initially hidden from public view, but which ultimately merged with other forces in the national arena of the United States. Some background
is in order.
During the Napoleonic period (1798-1815), most of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the Western hemisphere took advantage of their mother country's preoccupation in the continental wars of Europe to declare and establish their independence. Mexico was one such country. By 1812, its independence had been established in the de facto sense, and it claimed the same area of land which Spain had formerly possessed, which meant that the Republic of Mexico claimed everything north of the Isthmus of Panama to the 54th parallel on the Pacific side of North America, and the territories of Spanish Louisiana and the Floridas to the West.
Of course, this claim of territory conflicted with U.S. claims. The U.S., over strong Spanish objection, claimed the Louisiana Territory by right of purchase from France in 1803. It also
claimed Western Florida by right of annexation, and had made military moves against East Florida in an effort to annex that region. Given Mexico's claim, not surprisingly, the U.S. was more
than a bit tardy in recognizing either Mexican independence or extending formal diplomatic recognition with the Republic of Mexico. Rather, it followed the path of national self-interest,
waiting for the moment when Spain came to its inevitable realization that it would not be able to reconquer its possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and negotiate a "reasonable settlement"
to its de jure withdrawal.
That policy paid dividends in 1819 when the U.S. and Spain signed the great Trans-Continental Treaty, also known as the Adams-Onis Treaty. Spain conveyed its claim and title to the Floridas
and Louisiana, and (equally important) defined the borders of the latter, thus setting the international boundary between the U.S.and Mexico. The border was set at the Sabine River, the present boundary between Louisiana and Texas.
U.S. - MEXICAN RELATIONS
Having thus secured a legitimate claim to territories it had already acquired, the U.S. was willing to recognize the independence of the Republic of Mexico in 1822. Immediately,
relations between the two countries got off on a bad foot with the failure of the U.S. to appoint a Minister to the Republic of Mexico. The question of who was to receive the appointment became
a political football that was tossed about during the Monroe administration. Thus it wasn't until 1825 that a choice was made.
The Monroe administration appointed Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina, with instructions as follows:
First, Poinsett was to assure the Mexican government of U.S. friendliness and to explain the purpose and scope of the Monroe Doctrine. The fact that Poinsett received such instructions is per se evidence of the wary frame of mind anticipated in the Mexicans.
The Monroe Doctrine refers to the few paragraphs dealing with foreign policy enclosed in President Monroe's state of the Union message to Congress in 1823. In its most simple form, what came to be called "doctrine" consisted of two principles. First, any attempt by Europeans to further colonize the Americas or interfere in the internal affairs of the Western Hemisphere would be viewed with displeasure by the U.S. Second: the U.S. would remain aloof from European quarrels and diplomatic alliances. Historians are eager to point out that chiefs of state rarely draw a line in the sand, as Monroe did, without some consideration. Was there a possibility, or a probability of further European colonization in the Western Hemisphere as of 1823? The answer is yes and no.
Spain was still smarting from the loss of her former colonies, and there was much loose talk in Europe about reestablishing her position in the Western Hemisphere, but most of it was just that -
talk. On the other hand, there was one European nation actively colonizing in that region - Russia. In the 1790's Russian explorers had crossed the Bering Sea from Siberia to Alaska and
staked out a claim to that region. By the 1820's, Russian fur traders had pushed south, expanding the Russian claim. By 1823, the southern-most trading post of Russia was just north of what is
now San Francisco. The Russian position there complicated the diplomatic picture of the last large land area in North America yet to be incorporated by a European power - The Oregon Territory. As of 1823, four nations had claims to that parcel of property: the U.S., Britain, Russia and - the Republic of Mexico.
The Monroe doctrine then was, by implication, a statement of U.S. intention in the area. And since Mexico also had a claim to the Oregon territory, Joel R. Poinsette had the unenviable task of
persuading the Mexican's that the U.S. had no ambitions in the area.
This task proved contradictory to another instruction which Poinsett received from Monroe - to get a rectification of the U.S. Mexican border, the Sabine River border - the same that had been
established by international agreement in 1819. Poinsette was to offer to purchase everything from the Rio-Grande River east, alternately the province of Texas.
This area, the province of Texas was, by 1825, inhabited by more Americans than native Mexicans. Thanks to the adverse effects of the 1819 depression which bankrupt Southern planters as well as western farmers, thousands of southern cotton growers had taken
advantage of Mexico's liberal immigration and land laws and expanded the cotton cultivation across the Sabine River into the Province of Texas. By 1825 their numbers were sufficient to make them dominant in the provincial legislature, and not a few were ympathetic to the idea of belonging to the Union which they had recently left.
Poinsett's attempt to convince Mexico that the U.S. had no xpansion desires floundered under the circumstances of the contradictory instructions. Relations soon deteriorated further
when Poinsette was recalled after the election of 1828 and replaced y an appointee of Andrew Jackson, one Anthony Butler, former olonel, U.S. Army, a personal friend and comrade-in-arms of "General" Jackson, and everything you would not want in an ambassador: a gambler, a drunkard, a usurer, and a liar - in short, a typical product of the spoils system that Jackson was
introducing into politics.
Butler's instructions boiled down to the simple injunction: "Get a more westerly boundary." And be it said that the new U.S. ambassador worked overtime to achieve this aim. He tried
persuasion. It didn't work. He tried bribery. That didn't work either. He tried to fabricate a claim to Mexican territory and then managed to botch that sordid work by negotiating a commercial treaty in which he recognized the legality of the Sabine River boundary. Eventually he was declared persona non grate by the Mexican government and recalled. But the net results of the Poinsett and Butler missions were to not only antagonize the Mexicans, but alert them to the imperialistic mood of their next door neighbor.
It took little reflection for the Mexican government to foresee what the next chapter would produce. Having history as a guide to the method by which the U.S. had established its claim to both East and West Florida, it didn't take Mexican officials long to conclude that the same could happen in Texas. The U.S. would sponsor a "popular revolution" among settlers there, leading to the proclamation of an independent Texas and followed by the inevitable annexation of that province into the U.S. Mexico took immediate steps to prevent this scenario from occurring. In 1830, its central government passed a law aimed at securing Texas by restricting further immigration into the province, prohibiting the further importation of slaves into the country, legalizing the garrisoning of federal troops in the region and - most decidedly, joining Texas with the neighboring province of Coahuila, thus giving loyal Mexicans a majority in the
provincial government.
THE TEXAS REVOLUTION
This act, widely denounced by the affected Americans, produced the first stirrings of the Texas Revolution in which the figure of Santa Ana, a Mexican politician and military figure loomed large. Posing first as a "state's right" advocate, Santa Ana gained the backing of the Texas Americans by promising to repeal the offending legislation in return for support for his bid for presidency. Once in office however, his promise was compromised. He continued to
join Texas with Coahuilla. When in 1835, Santa Ana abolished the federal constitution, replacing it with a centralized state, the Texans rebelled.
After a few preliminary skirmishes, including one at a place called the Alamo, afterward elevated in American mythology to the status of a battle, the Texans won a major victory at the Battle of San Jacinto in April, 1836. In the wake of that defeat, the Mexican army retreated south of the Rio Grande river an ceased exerting any meaningful authority north of that line.
Nevertheless, Mexico refused to recognize the independence of the new government established there - The Republic of Texas.
Meanwhile, back in Washington, the administration of Andrew Jackson had given the Texas rebels everything short of full support in the "liberation" efforts. President Jackson and Sam Houston, leader of the Texas rebels and first President of the new Texas Republic, were personal friends and in constant communication both prior to and during the course of the revolution. Anticipating the eventual annexation of the region, Jackson permitted international
law to be violated by allowing American citizens to sell contraband to the Texans and permitting the enlistment of "volunteers" on American soil. The President even went so far as to offer covert
military aid in the form of secret instructions to General Edmund P. Gaines, U.S. Army, to take a position west of the Sabine River late in 1835, to be in a position to assist the Texas rebels repel
the Mexican troops advancing north toward San Jacinto. This support proved to be redundant, as the Texans handled the army of Santa Ana without U.S. intervention.
Despite President Jackson's evident desire to add Texas to the Union, he did not immediately recognize the independence of that country, nor respond to overtures aimed at annexation. The
reluctance of "Old Hickory" here had nothing to do with a change of heart, but rather with domestic problems. The year was now 1836. An election was on the horizon. Texas was filled with slave-owning planters of cotton. The institution of slavery was recognized by the Constitution of the Republic of Texas. Should it enter the union, it would do so with that institution intact. Thus, the annexation of Texas posed an implicit violation of the Compromise
of 1820. Northern abolitionists were spreading false rumors that the entire campaign among Southerners, including the slave owing President Jackson, was nothing more than an effort by slave holders to expand the institution of bond slavery into the West. Further, any precipitous move by Jackson might trigger war with Mexico, which had not adjusted to the loss of its property.
Under the circumstances, Jackson wisely decided to leave the question of Texas annexation to his successor, Martin Van Buren, who was the anointed one after Calhoun's split with the
administration. The delay proved to be momentous in its consequences. Van Burn, upon taking office in March, 1837, came face to face with the consequences of Jackson's "Bank War." Having supported Jackson's precipitous movement to "Kill the Monster" (that being the Second Bank of the United States), Van Burn lived to reap both the economic and political consequences of that vulgar display of "Jacksonian Democracy." The collapse of the restraining hand which the BUS had held over smaller, state-chartered banks, resulted in a rapid expansion of paper money - in short - inflation. This in turn led to speculation - mostly in western lands which were rapidly purchased by speculators with the easy money available until Jackson cut speculators short with his executive order - The Specie Circular - which required specie payment on mortgaged and
new western lands. The resulting panic resulted in a full blown depression that not only impacted agriculture as well as industry, and threatened the solvency of the government.
The old opponents of Jackson, The National Republicans, suddenly discovered what is now axiomatic in American politics. Any depression accrues to the political disadvantage of the incumbent President. In the economic carnage wrought by Van Buren's maladroit handling of the panic, the National Republicans gathered in the disaffected elements and emerged with a new party label and a new coalition - The Whigs. Included in the fall out was a withdrawal in October, 1838 of Texas' Petition for annexation. The Texans, muffed by lack of attention on the part of the U.S., decided to play hard-to-get.
By 1840, domestic concerns over the depression of 1837 had completely eclipsed the issue of Texas annexation from the public mind. The Whigs won the 1840 election by the simple expediency of by-passing their natural leaders, Clay, Webster, and the disaffected John C. Calhoun, nominating a national military hero with a "Madison Avenue" image, and substituting parades, slogans and mud-slinging for a platform.
Unfortunately for the fortunes of the Whigs, Harrison survived only long enough in office to read his inaugural address and then die. Apparently taking his image of a "common man" more literally than he should have, Harrison elected not to wear a coat during his inauguration. He caught pneumonia and died on April 4. 1837, bringing into the Presidency one John Tyler, and with him a few surprises.
Political shake-outs, like the one produced in the wake of the Panic of 1837, make for strange bed fellows. John Tyler is proof of that proposition. A life long Democrat, an avowed Jeffersonian, and a native of Virginia, he immediately collided with the "Real" Whigs, whose leaders included the nationalistic and Hamiltonian personalities of Webster and Clay. Tyler, as we have seen, wound up being defrocked by the Whigs.
Poor John Tyler. Considering his predecessors, Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, all fellow Virginians, Tyler had managed to arrive at the bottom of the Presidential pantheon by
virtue of being a Jeffersonian caught in the web of a Hamiltonian party. As many Presidents before and after, Tyler contemplated his position in history and recognized his probable position. What was needed, he realized, was an act of statesmanship, some illustrious triumph to add a bit of gloss over an otherwise desolate administration. Thus, out of political ambition and a desire to
secure a place in history, John Tyler decided to bring the issue of Texas into the forefront of American politics by completing its "inevitable annexation."
Having made this decision, Tyler replaced Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, with Abel P. Upshur, who proved to be one of the most able (no pun intended) gentlemen to hold that office.
Upshur laid the diplomatic groundwork for easing Texas into the Union by playing the diverse domestic and international interest carefully off, one against one another.
And what were those interests? First and foremost was public opinion in the North. Hostile to any breach in the balance of power established by the Compromise of 1820, Northern public
opinion was further influenced by the abolitionist contention, first advanced by Benjamin Lundy, amounting to a conspiracy theory Lundy was the first, but not the last of the abolitionists who
charged that the entire colonization of Texas, the Texas Revolution and the movement to annex Texas was nothing more than a conspiracy by Southern Planters to gain "bigger pens to cram with slaves."
Then there was Texas itself. Having been rebuffed in its efforts to gain immediate annexation into the Union due to domestic political considerations which we have noted, Texas was playing
"hard to get." What Texas thought it was, was proving to be considerably more than was "Texas" was. As a province of Mexico, Texas was considerably less in geographical extent than the area
over which The Republic of Texas pretended to extend it's laws. Texas claimed the area north of the Rio Grande to the 49th parallel (the current Canadian border). By 1841, it had reached the
collective opinion that, should it be annexed into the U.S., the area it claimed should be the area recognized. That recognition of "Greater Texas" would not only incite a possible war with Mexico, which had not yet recognized Texas independence, but also Britain, whose claims to the Oregon Territory were involved in the expansionist view of what Texas was or wasn't.
But these were not the only concerns of Abel P. Upshur as he took up his duties as Secretary of State. The British government had read the Monroe Doctrine as closely as the Mexican government had perused it. They too had come to the quick realization that, implicit in its articulation, was a U.S. claim to the Oregon Territory. Since this lay well above the extension of the U.S. - Canadian boundary line, the British anticipated what the Mexican Government anticipated - a surge of American imperialism at the expense of British Canada. The term "Manifest Destiny" had not been coined in 1841, but its sentiments were alive and visible to
any close observer. The British Foreign Office was filled with close observers who saw the signs of an impending burst of American imperialism.
The first sign was evident in the American reaction to a small scale insurrection that occurred in Canada in 1837, one that led American expansionists to revive the old dream of annexing that
region into the United States. All along the Northern frontier of the United States, private American citizens organized support groups for the Canadian rebels, smuggling volunteers, money and supplies across the border. Under the circumstances, it was only a matter of time before an international incident occurred.
That incident came on December 29, 1837 when an American vessel, the Caroline, under lease to an American group to run supplies into Canada for support of the revolutionists, was attacked by elements of the Canadian militia. In the fracas an american was killed, and the Caroline destroyed. Unfortunately, for the British, the attack upon that vessel occurred while it was on the American side of the Niagara River, technically in American waters. Protest notes from the State Department demanding apologies, compensation and a diplomatic mea culpa followed.
By 1840, just when feelings over the incident were beginning to diminish, they were revived when a Canadian (British citizen) by the name of Alexander McLeod found himself in a New York saloon where, under the influence of American whiskey, he began bragging that he was a member of the Canadian militia which had attacked the Caroline, and was the marksman who had killed the lone American casualty of the fracas. The New York authorities took McLeod at
his work, arrested and indicted him on the charge of murder which provoked another diplomatic "incident." Britain now took offense, demanded an apology, immediate release, and, more important, drew a parallel to the circumstances then unfolding in the Aroostock
timber reserves of northern Maine.
Connections, connections, connections! Or how a Foreign Office adds 1, 2 and 3 and comes up with the sum of 6. During the winter of 1838-1839, lumber companies from both the Canadian and American side of the Main border moved into the rich Aroostock timer lands and began feeling trees. Since the border in that region had not been defined, both companies took an expansive view of where it resided and were soon swinging axes at one another rather than the
trees. Not surprisingly, both companies called upon their respective authorities to support their claims.
The state of Maine responded by putting the militia on mobilization status in a show of support. the Governor of New Brunswick followed suit on the Canadian side. Upon request from
Maine, President Van Buren moved U.S. regulars into the region and called upon Congress to increase the strength of the U. S. Army. A like request on the Canadian side went out to London. A crisis of major proportions could easily have resulted in war between the U.S. and Great Britain had not cooler heads prevailed. Among those so disposed was Daniel Webster, Tyler's inherited Secretary of State, who remained in office after the rest of the cabinet resigned and thus earned the respect of his countryman, if not his contemporaries, for negotiating a compromise settlement ofthe issue.
Nevertheless, the combination of events: the Caroline incident, the McLeod incident and the Aroostock Timber War, when read against the background of the Monroe Doctrine, produced the inevitable, and valid conclusion in the mind of the British Government, that American territorial expansion was about to be unleashed. That the expansion might well encompass British claims to the Oregon Territory as well as the Republic of Texas, brought Britain into the scope of Secretary Upshur's diplomatic spectrum.
That was quite an alignment of opposing forces for a new, and untested Secretary of State to face. The hostility of Mexico, Britain and northern public opinion, plus the coyness of Texas had
to be overcome. The odds against success would have caused an broker to blush at the odds. But, by playing Britain off against Mexico, and northern suspicion off against hostility against
Britain, Upshur succeeded in negotiating the Upshur-Van Zandt Treaty in early 1844, which cleared the way for the annexation of Texas by Treaty (which required the approval of 2/3 of the Senate).
Shortly thereafter, Upshur conducted an informal count of the U.S. Senate, which revealed a clear 2/3 majority in favor of the Treaty.
At this point in the story fate intervened, as it often did in accordance with the script borrowed from Greek drama. Abel P. Upshur, Secretary of State, accepted the invitation of the U.S.
Navy to be the guest of honor at the inspection of the navy's latest warship, the U.S.S. Princeton which boasted the latest in naval high-tech ordinance, a breech -loading canon. As the
reigning dignitary, Secretary Upshur was given the honor of pulling the lanyard firing the new device. It promptly responded by exploding at the breech, killing the Secretary of State.
President John Tyler, native of Virginia, Jeffersonian by ideological inclination, desirous of establishing his place in American history by annexing Texas turned South to replace the
departed Abel P. Upshur. He found John C. Calhoun, ardent annexationist, experienced in politics (Representative, Senator, Cabinet Member and Vice-President), waiting in the wings.
Calhoun's interest in Texas coincided with his perennial political ambition, both personal and ideological. Calhoun was one of many southern politicians who noted that "Texas" was an
ambiguous territory. Claiming an area of land twice the extent of that occupied while a province of Mexico, "Texas" was demanding U.S. recognition of the "Big Texas" as the price to be paid for a treaty of annexation. Southern politicians, alert to the possibility of offsetting the shift in political fortunes which had accrued to the North in the House of Representatives, saw in Texas
the possibility of carving several new states out of the region, thus tipping the balance of power in the Senate definitively to the favor of the South. In his elevation to Secretary of State,
Calhoun had the second opportunity in his life of achieving at least his second ambition: preserving to the South its position of dominance within the Union.
At this moment of truth, his elevation to the position of Secretary of State, it is as though the fates of Greek tragedy intervened to wreck havoc. With the ground work of annexation so
well prepared by Abel P. Upshur, Secretary of State John C. Calhoun immediately sowed the seeds of dissension and discord. And, as a fitting tribute to Greek tragedy, Calhoun managed to do it almost unconsciously, but decidedly, by his own hand.
In April, 1844, shortly after his confirmation as Secretary of State, Calhoun received a diplomatic note from the British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Pakinham. The note was, in the parlance of diplomacy, a courtesy note, outlining to the new Secretary of State the British position on all outstanding issues then existing between the British government and that of the United States. In it, the British Ambassador called attention to the well-known fact that the British Government was in the process of abolishing slavery throughout the Empire, and actively advocating that position.
Calhoun replied, and in his response unfortunately for his cause, "blew his cool." He took the occasion to not only reprimand the British Ambassador, but to set forth his vigorous "Positive
Good" position on the institution of bond slavery. Naturally, the contents of his reply to the Pakinham note, became public knowledge, and Northern public opinion, wavering between the
warnings of abolitionists of a slave conspiracy and the cool pragmatism of Secretary of State Abel P. Upshur, yielded to the abolitionist contention that the entire subject of Texas annexation
was nothing more or less than a conspiracy by slave holders designed to extend the institution of bond slavery into the West.
Thus the issue of Texas annexation (by treaty at least) died at the hands of its firmest advocate, Calhoun, the personification of that sectional interest which had most to gain by the admission of
Texas to the Union. In one of the rare moments in which passion had replaced calm reason, Calhoun had allowed emotion to reign supreme. The consequences were to prove not only fatal to his stand as a spokesman for the Union, but for the security of the South within the Union.
Chapter 24. TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND THE QUARREL OVER THE SPOILS
OF WAR
Calhoun's precipitous action in responding to the Pakinham note removed any chance that the annexation treaty could muster the necessary 2/3rds vote in the Senate. But that was not to say that aspiring politicians were not hard at work to accomplish the same results by other methods. By 1844, a number of Democrats, motivated largely by the desire to win the upcoming election
against the incumbent Whigs, had found a solution to the problem.
The issue of territorial expansion, which up to that point had meant the incorporation of Texas, was a much broader issue than it appeared. The Caroline and McLeod incidents and the Aroostock Timber War pointed to that conclusion. So did public interest in the Oregon boundary question. Most revealing of all was an upsurge of sentiment favoring "Manifest Destiny," the belief that it was the duty of Americans to expand their civilization and institutions across the breadth of North America. Although the phrase was first employed only in 1845 when John L. O'Sullivan used it in an article on the annexation of Texas, the sentiments he attached to that term
predated 1845:
Texas has been absorbed into the Union in the inevitable
fulfillment of the general law which is rolling our population
westward; the connection of which with that ratio of growth in
population which is destined within a hundred years to swell our
numbers to the enormous population of two hundred and fifty
millions is too evident to leave us in doubt of the manifest
design of Providence in regard to the occupation of this
continent. A population will soon be in actual occupation of
California, over which it will be idle for Mexico to dream of
dominion. They will necessarily become independent. All this
without agency of our government, without responsibility of our
people in the natural flow of events, the spontaneous working of
principles, and the adaptation of the tendencies and wants of
the human race to the elemental circumstances in the midst of
which they find themselves placed."
The Oregon question dates back to 1818 when, by a U.S. - British treaty, the Canadian boundary west of the Great Lakes was fixed at the 49th parallel to the summit of the Rocky Mountains. West of the Rockies, the two governments had agreed upon a status of "joint
occupancy," for a period of 10 years. That region became known as the Oregon Territory. Its southern order was fixed the following year in the Adams-Onis Treaty with Spain as running along the 42nd parallel. The Northern border of Oregon lay at 54 degrees 40 minutes North latitude, adjacent to Russian Alaska.
In 1828, at the expiration of the 10 year span set in 1818, the two countries simply extended joint occupation for an indefinite period of time. That played into the hands of the Americans, as
slowly but surely a substantial flow of American immigrants arrived in the territory, and with them came pressure for total control of Oregon.
As might be expected, western settlers were one such interest group. Behind them were land speculators adding their voices. And New England merchants, such as John J. Astor, whose Astor Pacific Fur Company was already a heavy investor in the region, were vocal. It is not too much to say that the entire Far East Trade, just then being opened up to Americans, hinged upon control of the North West Pacific Coast, inasmuch as the only exportable product Americans
could use in the Oriental trade were furs.
By 1843, pressure for U.S. annexation of the Oregon territory was clearly becoming organized. In that year some 120 delegates from six north-western states met in Cincinnati and issued a
manifesto demanding the extension of U.S. law over the Oregon territory up to 54 degrees 40 minutes North latitude. What was clear to any observant politician after 1843 was that there existed a community of interest in the North, South and West with a unifying desire - expansion.
By 1844, Democratic politicians were aware that if they could combine the annexation of Texas with the annexation of suitable territory in the north, it could unite the country behind a policy
of imperialism. And, what was more, it was an issue which the Democrats could
have all to themselves, due to the overanticipation of the leading Whig candidate who had taken too much for granted.
The presidential race of 1844 had gotten under way early for the Whigs. Inasmuch as John Tyler had been declared persona non grata and denied his membership in that party, Henry Clay had become the titular leaders of the Whigs and had cultivated those who would influence the forthcoming nominating convention. On the Democratic side, the nomination of Martin Van Buren appeared to be assured. Thus, to all appearances, it looked with a Clay v Ban Buren match-up in 1844.
Anticipating this alignment, both of the potential candidates reached the same conclusion regarding Texas. It was too divisive to be brought up during the campaign. And in line with that
conclusion, both circulated public statements opposing "immediate" annexation of Texas, and laying before the new Congress the final decision on the matter.
Sometimes passing the buck works in politics. Sometimes it backfires. The Whigs held their convention and, as anticipated, nominated Clay. But when the Democrats held their convention,
Souther delegates demanded what amounted to a veto over the nomination of that parties candidate. Bowing to that pressure, the Rules Committee of the Democratic Party adopted th 2/3 Rule requiring that the party's candidate be one who received, no a simple majority of the delegate vote, but a 2/3rds vote in the convention.
When the balloting began it was clear that, while Van Buren was the front runner, he could not command the required 2/3rds vote. Too many Southern delegates were opposed to Van Buren's opposition to Texas annexation to permit him to get the required votes. And when the convention eventually deadlocked, the party elders came forward with the first "Dark Horse candidate" James Knox Polk. The Democrats could then, since Polk had never taken a position on Texas, adopt one. Their platform boldly called for "The Reoccupation of Oregon and the Reannexation of Texas." Their campaign slogan became "Fifty-four forty or Fight," a direct
reference to the U.S. claim for all of the Oregon territory up to 54 degrees 40 minutes north latitude.
It proved to be a winning combination uniting as it did the imperialistic sentiments of votes in all sections of the country while remaining vague enough to avoid dealing with the political
ramifications of annexing additional territory. The Whigs, smarting from being outwitted by the Democrats, in their lame-duck cession, elected to deny the incoming Democrats the "glory" of
annexing Texas. A Joint resolution was pushed through both houses of Congress by Whig legislatures, thus avoiding the necessary 2/3rds vote.
Thus, when Polk took office, Texas was technically in the Union. The only issue remaining was what were the borders of Texas? The Texans you will recall, had a most expansive idea of what their borders were, being an area greatly in excess of the old provincial boundaries. But for the U.S. to stand behind the Texas claim would likely require a war with Mexico.
Polk elected to stand behind the Texas claim, which stretched as far south as the Rio Grande River. And while recognizing this might bring on war, elected to broaden the reach of American over Mexican lands in that events, to include all Mexican lands west of Texas, including the California territory.
To achieve this foreign policy goal, one which ultimately increased by one third the territorial size of the United States, Polk introduced a two prong policy. On the one hand, John Slidel
was commissioned as American Minster to Mexico with instructions to offer up to $30 million for a Rio Grande boundary and California, but not to return with anything less than a Rio Grande boundary.
At the same time as Slidel was attempting negotiations, the second prong of the Polk policy was set into motion. Thomas O.Larkin, a covert operative was sent to California with instructions
to prepare a revolution there among the settlers who were to proclaim independence from Mexico and apply for annexation to the United States. As matters turned out, both efforts filed. Slidell couldn't persuade the Mexican government to relinquish its lands through negotiation and Larkin, although initially successful in mobilizing a considerable network in preparation of a revolt, saw events run beyond his control.
Captain John C. Fremont, U.S. Army regular, had earlier been sent out by his government with a force of 62 men, to chart a suitable overland route from the Mississippi R. to the Oregon
territory for future settlers. Whether or not Fremont knew of the Larkin mission, or had secret instructions, is still debated. Nevertheless, with the onset of winter, Fremont decided to move his
forces south into the milder climate of California in December, 1845, where the Mexican authorities politely asked him to withdraw. Fremont complied and moved back into Oregon. Apparently at this inopportune juncture, an uprising occurred in the Sacramento Valley
where the rebels hoisted a flag with a Bear on it, hence the "Bear Flag Revolt." Fremont hurried back into California to support the uprising. Larkin, to the South, quietly working his quiet intrigue among native Mexicans, was caught unawares of events to the North, but the reaction among native Mexicans was quick. All of the pro-annexation sentiment Larkin had worked to produced was transformed into outright anti-American sentiment because of Fremont's strong-
arm tactics.
The failure of the Slidell Mission and Larkins' intrigues finally convinced Polk that the only possible way to achieve his territorial goals was through War. On Jan 13, 1846, Polk ordered
General Zachery Taylor to take an American army of 4,000 men into the disputed territory between the Nueces River (the old southern boundary of provincial Texas) and the Rio Grande River. South of that latter border was the entrenched Mexican Army. With both
armies in close proximity to one another, it was only a matter of time before an incident occurred.
And not too soon for Polk. On Saturday, May 9, 1846, Polk had held a cabinet meeting where he put to its members the issue of a war resolution. The cabinet endorsed their president and a draft of a presidential request to congress was prepared. That same evening, news arrived in Washington that shots had been exchanged between General Taylor and the Mexican forces. Since Polk had already decided on war, he only had to make a few changes in the prepared text, adding a phony passing stating that "Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States...and shed American blood upon the American soil." Congress passed the requested war resolution on May 13, but by then the fighting had begun. The Battle of Palo Alto was fought on May 8th, with the Mexicans' losing.
The Mexican-American War failed to unify the nation as the Democrats had hope. Popular sentiment, especially in the North, was ambiguous among many, and hostile among the few. Henry David Thoreau among others, gained his place among civil libertarians by refusing to pay taxes to support the war. Even within the ranks of the Democrats, there was dissension, and it was growing. Norther Democrats had been thrilled when, in April, 1846, President Polk had formally notified Britain that the 1818 treaty dividing Oregon was terminated. Polk appeared to be bolstering their demand that the U.S. simply declared the region annexed and let the Brits lick their wounds. But Polk, having elected to commence war with Mexico in May, decided that war with Britain at the same time was too much. In June, Polk reversed himself on Oregon and permitted negotiations to open. The result was that Oregon was neatly divided in half by extending the 49th parallel border.
The first rupture in the ranks of the Democrats was forthcoming. Northern members of that party were quick to point out that Polk, a Tennessee slave holder, had kept faith with Southern Democrats by baking up the claim for a "Big Texas." And, Polk had gone to war for that. But when push came to shove, Polk had let his northern allies down in Oregon from 54/40 to 49 to avoid war. Polk they charged, favored southern ambitions.
This initial rupture among the Democrats widened when in May, 1846 a new appropriation bill designed to raise $10,000,000 to finance the Mexican-American War, saw the protective feature
removed from the tariff in order to increase revenues. The Walker Tariff, as it came to be known, also imposed new rates upon such luxury items as tea and coffee. Northern Democrats charged that the luxury taxes shifted the burden of financing the war upon the backs of Northerners, pointing out that few of any of the three million slaves in the South consumed such luxuries. It did not go unnoticed among such Northern Democrats that the Walker tariff was passed in the Senate only by the votes of the new Texas Senators.
Adding to the rupture was Polk's decision, at the beginning of his administration to ease Martin Van Buren's followers out of positions of influence. Recalling Van Buren's strength in the late
convention, and undoubtedly with an eye to a second term as President, Polk denied Van Buren's faction not only influence, but patronage - the Spoils of Office. The fact that Van Buren, a New
York politicians, represented Northern interests, was apparently forgotten by this Southern President. A Presidential veto of an internal improvement bill designed to aid shipping on the Great Lakes didn't improve Polk's standing with the northern wing of his party either.
But the trump cause in the split that followed during this administration came when Souther politicians to talk about gerrymandering the Spoils of War - i.e., the territories to be
acquired from Mexico, in order create enough new Southern states in the South West as to solidify the South's dominance of the Senate. When Polk appeared to lend support to this effort, Northern Democrats responded in kind.
In the fall of 1846, when the House of Representatives undertook an appropriations bill after Polk's request for an additional $2 million to finance the war, a Pennsylvania Democrat, hitherto known only for his party fidelity, named David Wilmot, attacked a short amendment to the bill declaring that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist" in any territories acquired
from Mexico. Once again, as in 1819 when Missouri applied for statehood, a northern politician had raised the issue of slavery and attached it to the issue of western lands. That politics more
than morality influenced this strategic move is gleaned from the proposal of New York Representative, George Rathburn, an otherwise ardent supporter of the Proviso. If, he proposed, the south would abandon the 3/5th clause of the constitution, thereby reducing its political power in the House and Electoral College, the North would in exchange allowe planters to bring their slaves into the western territories.
The reaction of, what was to be known as the "Wilmot Proviso" electrified the North. A Boston newspaper prophetically observed that it had "brought to a head the great question which is about to divide the American people." Whether of not clairvoyance is to be acknowledge or not, Wilmot's amended had the desired effect. Whig and Democratic Congressmen stopped voting as party regulars and voted as sectional representatives. The mood of western
congressmen in particular was encouraging to northern politicians. In both private and public discussions, westerners began to advocate a "free soil" policy for western territories. Although
this position, later to be enshrined in the Republican Party Platform, did not attack slavery on moral grounds, it attacked it on political, economic and racist grounds.
Increasingly, westerners saw slavery as a threat to the economic well being of farmers. The introduction of a plantation economy it was argued, would require free white farmers to compete with black slaves, to the detriment of the former. The racist portion of the argument came from the fact that white western farmers also opposed the introduction of free blacks into the territories for the same reason. Northern politicians were quick to applaud this "enlightened" attitude by their western colleagues. David Wilmot went so far as to exclaim that his proviso was intended to preserve the western territories for the "sons of toil, of my own race and own color."
Calhoun, as the principle spokesman for the South responded with both legal and political argument. The Wilmot Provision was, he declared, unconstitutional, as was the Missouri Compromise. That Calhoun should at this moment denounce the compromise he had
supported at the time is indicative of the sharp antagonism existing between the sections. Anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v Sanford some 10 years off, Calhoun
maintained that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to exclude slavery from the territory. He also pointed to the rapidity with which such slave states as Delaware were selling their
remaining slaves to the Deep South, a move injurious to the South's political position in the Union. Other Southern politicians were more extreme. Senator Robert Toombs of George warned that if Congress passed the Wilmot Proviso, he would favor disunion rather
than "degradation."
By 1848, with an election on the horizon and Congress still divided over the Wilmot Proviso, the Democrats decided to scuddle President Polk as too intimately tied to the South for the good of a national party. By the normal definitions associated with the word "Success," Polk was successful. He had, at the outset of his administration, set forth four goals. He had met them all. But by 1848 the United States was no longer a nation in which the usual rules of politics applied. When the Democratic convention met in Baltimore in the Summer of 1848, it was so badly divided over the Wilmot Proviso, that the Rules Committee passed a motion requiring the delegates to pledge their support to whatever candidate might be nominated. Fearing that this meant Polk again, norther delegates walked out of the convention. The remaining delegates
deserted Polk and went on to nominated Lewis Cass, a Western Senator and proponent of "Popular sovereignty" as a middle position between the Wilmot Proviso and the South's demand for the right to extend slaves into the western territories. This "doctrine" as it was soon dubbed, would leave the decision of whether to permit slavery in a territory to the local territorial legislature. Cass was widely denounced during the campaign by Northerners who coined
the term "Doughface" (a northern man with southern principles,something akin to "Oreo" in today's parlance.) to describe him.
Enough dissatisfaction with Cass existed in the Northto cause a faction of the New York Democrats bolt the party and support their favorite sun, Martin Van Buren.
As another means to avoid dealing with the divisive issue, Popular sovereignty had a certain appeal. But the Whigs found a better way to avoid the issue. They revived their formula, so
successful in 1840 of by-passing their natural leaders, Clay and Webster and going outside the party for a national military hero. And with the recent and successful completion of the Mexican-
American War, the Whigs had a full field to choose from. There was Zachery Taylor, "Old Rough and Ready," the "Hero of Buneau Vista," Taylor was tremendously popular, but wholly devoid of any political qualifications for high office. Then there was Winfield Scott,
"Old Fuss and Feathers." Scott had some of the qualifications for presidential consideration, but lacked the popular enthusiasm generated by Taylor. Given the choice, the Whigs followed the
rules of politics as laid down during the administrations of Andrew Jackson and nominated General Taylor, who was so far above partisan politics that it is unclear whether he had ever cast a vote in his life. (Thurlow Weed, Martin Van Buren's forceful state rival in New York claimed to have met General Taylor's brother in 1846 and upon asking him about the General's political principles, the reply was that the General had no; had belonged to no party, had never
voted and merely held several prejudices. He admired Clay, disliked Jackson, and was so anti-foreign that he would not even wear an imported garment. Weed mused for a moment before
concluding "Your brother is to be our next president.")
Even with the non-committal Taylor as their standard bearer, the Whigs could not keep the party faithful in line. A defecting element of Whigs, allegedly unhappy with the fact that Taylor was a Louisiana slave holder, dubbed themselves the "Conscience Whigs" and wrapped themselves in the mantle of the Wilmot Proviso. With disaffected Democrats and Whigs looking for a new place to roost, a fusion was in order. In the fall of 1848 these groups met in Buffalo, N.Y. to form the Free-Soil Party and nominate Martin Van Buren. The platform of this third party was a somewhat garbled mixture of ardent abolitionism, racist opposition against free
blacks, and pure rhetoric. The party declared itself in favor of "Free soil, Free speech, Free labor and Free men."
The Whigs were the ultimate beneficiaries of these defections. New York cast its electoral votes for the Free Soilers at the expense of the Democrats. Those votes were the margin of victory by which the Whigs came back into power.
CALIFORNIA
If Thurlow Weed's commentary on the qualifications of Zachery Taylor beg credulity then perhaps the testimony of President Polk can be used. On inauguration day, 1849, as was conventional, the incoming president and the outgoing president shared a coach and
four from the White House to the inauguration stands for the swearing in ceremonies. During that ride, Polk asked Taylor what his California policy was to be. Soon to be President Taylor
responded that in his opinion, California was too distant to ever become a state in the Union, consequently it would be better for it to become a separate and independent government. To Polk, who had gone to war with Mexico to gain the territory, the soon to be president must have been unbearable in his naivety.
But the question of California was both disturbing to a lot of men other than Polk in the year 1849. In 1846 when Thomas Larkin was sent out their as a covert agent, California was a sleepy
backwater section of the Mexican Republic with no more than 4,000 residents. Then in January, 1848, gold was discovered at Sutter's Mill, and overnight, California experienced a stampede. Within six months its population exceeded that required for a territorial government, and by the end of the year its inhabitants exceed the numbers required for statehood. But neither was forthcoming from Congress in Washington, D.C.
When Congress assembled for business in the Spring of 1849, it was still divided over the Wilmot Proviso and party lines were rapidly dissolving; so badly that it took 63 ballots before a
Speaker of the House could be elected. Meanwhile, California was left without law, except that of vigilante law, or the law of the jungle. Land claims in California were dissolving overnight do to the absence of land laws; murders were going unpunished for lack of courts. As once historian summarized the region: "It was a state of nature that would have made Rousseau a Tory."
Congress was being bombarded with petitions from Californians to establish a territorial government to bring order our of the chaos. Congress wrangled over the Wilmot Proviso. To add to the political turbulence, President Taylor, under the urging of the Whig political hierarchy, decided to increase the prospect of California entering the Union as a Whig stronghold by recommending it and other territories skip the territorial stage and apply for immediate statehood. This would, the Whigs reasoned, eliminate any debate involving slavery.
As Congress wrangled over the Wilmot Proviso, the good people of California finally took matters into their own hands. Without authority, they assembled, drafted a state constitution, one that prohibited slavery, ratified it by popular vote, chose a Governor and Legislature and began functioning. They also sent the new constitution to Congress with a Petition demanding immediate admission into the Union, or else. The "or else," was that California would, if rejected, function as an independent state.
California's action inspired the people of New Mexico to follow suit. There a constitution, clearly prohibiting slavery was crafted. The conclusion was clear. Both California and New Mexico had adopted the Wilmot Proviso. But in doing so, they had violated the Compromise of 1820 which permitted slaves below parallel 30 degrees 30 minutes North Latitude. Time and time had run out. Events had moved beyond the ability of the government to control them.
Southerners, alarmed at the political implications of adding four new Senators whose votes would be aligned with those from the North, reacted as though both war and revolution were at hand. Throughout the south, local Committees of Safety and Committees of Correspondence, reminiscent of the Revolutionary era, organized in preparation for the coming deluge. Party lines between Whigs and Democrats gave way to sectional unity. A meeting of Southern politicians convened at Jackson, Mississippi in October, 1849 to hammer out a declaration of Southern grievances codifying the Southern position on slavery and calling for an all-Southern
convention to be held in Nashville in order to "devise and adopt some mode of resistance of (Northern) aggressions." In Washington, Congress assembled with the prospects of the
Nashville Convention hanging over their heads. None doubted that such a convention would urge secession as the ultimate safeguard for the Southern states. Members of both the House and Senate were observed entering their respective chambers with knives, derringers and pistols tucked beneath their outerwear
THE COMPROMISE OF 1850
Once more, Henry Clay stepped forward to play the role of compromiser. His approach was pragmatic: The North would get the substance of the Wilmot Proviso - the termination of slave
expansion. The South would get specific federal guarantees for its "peculiar institution" backed up by federal force if necessary. On January, 29, 1850 he presented the following package:
*California to enter the Union as a state, with its existing Constitution.
*Territorial Government to be established without congressional restrictions as to slavery in the territory between Texas and California.
*Set reasonable limits on the boundaries of Texas.
*A congressional resolution stating that slavery in the District of Columbia could not be abolished without the consent of the people of the District, the consent of Maryland, and without just compensation of slave owners.
*Prohibit the slave trade in the District of Columbia
*A congressional resolution asserting that Congress had no power to interfere with the slave trade between states.
*A stringent fugitive slave law.
The seventy debates which dealt with the terms of the Compromise of 1850 are among the most impressive in American history. As many northern politicians opposed it as southern politicians. Calhoun's remarks were perhaps the most pointed and the most prophetic. Too sick to stand, much less mount the podium, he was brought into the Senate Chamber on a stretcher while a colleague read his remarks. Calhoun urged his Southern allies to reject the compromise until an
ultimate guarantee, in the form of a constitutional amendment, would "restore to the South in substance, the power she possessed of protecting herself before the equilibrium between the two
sections was destroyed by the action of the government." In short, Calhoun warned his colleagues that the South was giving up the power to the North in exchange for its promises to allow slavery to exist where it was. Power versus a promise. Power means the ability to break one's promise. A promise means what?
Politics oft makes bed fellows. Joining Calhoun in urging rejection of the compromise was William H. Seward, a newly arrived Conscience Whig" from New York who was destined later to become Lincoln's Secretary of State. Seward urged, in essence that Congress disregard the law in deciding the issue of slavery. He appealed to heaven, formulating a "Higher-Law Doctrine," to urge rejection of the fugitive slave law or any endorsement of the institution of bond slavery.
After the debate, which lasted from January to September, the Senate defeated Clay's proposal. The "Great Pacificator" as his countrymen have since called him left Washington, tired and
disheartened. Into the gap left by Clay, Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois emerged. Taking the eight proposals which Clay had joined in an omnibus bill, Douglas separated them into five
separate bills. Each of the five received a majority vote. Congress had, at last, passed the Compromise.
President Taylor, who had opposed the compromise and was expected to veto at least one of the bills, obligingly died. His successor, Millard Fillmore, a New York Free Soiler, signed them
into law. After thirty years of wrangling over the balance of power, the scales were tipped 16 to 15 in the U. S. Senate in favor of free states. The rising industrial interests of the Norther had secured a basis of power upon which a more favorable government, and more favorable
legislation could be anticipated. The Nashville convention adjourned without action. The crisis had passed.
In the election of 1852, the people had an indirect opportunity pass judgment upon the compromise. The Democrats nominated Franklin Pierce, a non-entity from New Hampshire and came out four- square behind the compromise. The Whigs turned to another warhorse, Winfield Scott and no statements. The electoral vote, which gave the presidency to the Democrats by a whopping 254-42 margin, proved to be a blow from which the Whigs never recovered. In the next election, 1856, they were eclipsed by a third party which adopted the name of Republican. In the election of 1860 they abandoned their party name in an effort to broaden their appeal to
unionists voters. But by then, the country had altered dramatically.
John C. Calhoun died on March 31, 1850 before the compromise bills had been decided. Clay, who departed from Congress dispirited and ill, never returned and died the following year.
Daniel Webster, denounced by Northern abolitionist as traitor, lived only two years more. Andrew Jackson had died peacefully in bed in 1846, and John Q. Adams, who after his presidential defeat in 1828 had returned to Washington as a Representative from Mass.,
died in the House with his boots on in 1848. Thus passed the most visible and unique political figures in American history, the first generation of nationalist politicians. They had entered politics during the era of Jefferson, many of them in the election of 1810 which produced the War Hawks those ardent, patriotic spokesmen who were sensitive to issue of national honor and were spokesmen for the pride of a new nation. Each in his own way had saw the coming break-up of the Union had endeavored, within the limitations of the institutions in which they worked, to avoid it. Even John C. Calhoun had sought to find the formula that would preserve that Union. Now they were gone. The next generation of politicians did not meet the standards set by those who passed.