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Pearl Harbor: The Facts Behind the Fiction

by James Perloff

The raid on Pearl Harbor took the U.S. Pacific Fleet by surprise, but

back in Washington, the Roosevelt administration was fully aware of

the coming onslaught.

James Perloff is the author of

The Shadows of Power: The Council on Foreign Relations and the

American Decline and Tornado in a Junkyard: The Relentless Myth of

Darwinism. Both books are available through American Opinion Book

Services (www.aobs-store.com).

Over Memorial Day weekend, Disney will release Pearl Harbor, a film

granted the largest pre-production budget ($145 million) in cinema

history. The lavish production will, no doubt, be viewed by many

moviegoers as an accurate portrayal of the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor. Even the movie's leading man has bought into this notion. "I

really believe the film will be the definitive piece on the attack,"

said actor Ben Affleck. This is unfortunate, because the movie's

producer, Jerry Bruckheimer, proclaimed in an interview last year:

"There's a book that just came out which claims [President Franklin

D.] Roosevelt knew about the attack. That's all b***s***. He didn't

know about the attack!"

But comprehensive research has not only shown Washington knew in

advance of the attack, but deliberately withheld its foreknowledge

from our commanders in Hawaii in the hope that the "surprise" attack

would catapult the U.S. into World War II. Oliver Lyttleton, British

Minister of Production, stated in 1944: "Japan was provoked into

attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history to say

that America was forced into the war."

Although FDR desired to directly involve the United States in the

Second World War, his intentions sharply contradicted his public

pronouncements. A pre-war Gallup poll showed 88 percent of Americans

opposed U.S. involvement in the European war. Citizens realized that

U.S. participation in World War I had not made a better world, and in

a 1940 (election-year) speech, Roosevelt typically stated: "I have

said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your

boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."

But privately, the president planned the opposite. Roosevelt

dispatched his closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, to meet British Prime

Minister Winston Churchill in January 1941. Hopkins told Churchill:

"The President is determined that we [the United States and England]

shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me

here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you

through, no matter what happens to him -- there is nothing he will not

do so far as he has human power." William Stevenson noted in A Man

Called Intrepid that American-British military staff talks began that

same month under "utmost secrecy," which, he clarified, "meant

preventing disclosure to the American public." Even Robert Sherwood,

the president's friendly biographer, said: "If the isolationists had

known the full extent of the secret alliance between the United States

and Britain, their demands for impeachment would have rumbled like

thunder throughout the land."

Background to Betrayal

Roosevelt's intentions were nearly exposed in 1940 when Tyler Kent, a

code clerk at the U.S. embassy in London, discovered secret dispatches

between Roosevelt and Churchill. These revealed that FDR -- despite

contrary campaign promises -- was determined to engage America in the

war. Kent smuggled some of the documents out of the embassy, hoping to

alert the American public -- but was caught. With U.S. government

approval, he was tried in a secret British court and confined to a

British prison until the war's end.

During World War II's early days, the president offered numerous

provocations to Germany: freezing its assets; shipping 50 destroyers

to Britain; and depth-charging U-boats. The Germans did not retaliate,

however. They knew America's entry into World War I had shifted the

balance of power against them, and they shunned a repeat of that

scenario. FDR therefore switched his focus to Japan. Japan had signed

a mutual defense pact with Germany and Italy (the Tripartite Treaty).

Roosevelt knew that if Japan went to war with the United States,

Germany and Italy would be compelled to declare war on America -- thus

entangling us in the European conflict by the back door. As Harold

Ickes, secretary of the Interior, said in October 1941: "For a long

time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by

way of Japan."

Much new light has been shed on Pearl Harbor through the recent work

of Robert B. Stinnett, a World War II Navy veteran. Stinnett has

obtained numerous relevant documents through the Freedom of

Information Act. In Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl

Harbor (2000), the book so brusquely dismissed by director

Bruckheimer, Stinnett reveals that Roosevelt's plan to provoke Japan

began with a memorandum from Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum,

head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The

memorandum advocated eight actions predicted to lead Japan into

attacking the United States. McCollum wrote: "If by these means Japan

could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better." FDR

enacted all eight of McCollum's provocative steps -- and more.

While no one can excuse Japan's belligerence in those days, it is also

true that our government provoked that country in various ways --

freezing her assets in America; closing the Panama Canal to her

shipping; progressively halting vital exports to Japan until we

finally joined Britain in an all-out embargo; sending a hostile note

to the Japanese ambassador implying military threats if Tokyo did not

alter its Pacific policies; and on November 26th -- just 11 days

before the Japanese attack -- delivering an ultimatum that demanded,

as prerequisites to resumed trade, that Japan withdraw all troops from

China and Indochina, and in effect abrogate her Tripartite Treaty with

Germany and Italy.

After meeting with President Roosevelt on October 16, 1941, Secretary

of War Henry Stimson wrote in his diary: "We face the delicate

question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan

is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move -- overt move." On

November 25th, the day before the ultimatum was sent to Japan's

ambassadors, Stimson wrote in his diary: "The question was how we

should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the

first shot...."

The bait offered Japan was our Pacific Fleet. In 1940, Admiral J.O.

Richardson, the fleet's commander, flew to Washington to protest FDR's

decision to permanently base the fleet in Hawaii instead of its normal

berthing on the U.S. West Coast. The admiral had sound reasons: Pearl

Harbor was vulnerable to attack, being approachable from any

direction; it could not be effectively rigged with nets and baffles to

defend against torpedo planes; and in Hawaii it would be hard to

supply and train crews for his undermanned vessels. Pearl Harbor also

lacked adequate fuel supplies and dry docks, and keeping men far from

their families would create morale problems. The argument became

heated. Said Richardson: "I came away with the impression that,

despite his spoken word, the President was fully determined to put the

United States into the war if Great Britain could hold out until he

was reelected."

Richardson was quickly relieved of command. Replacing him was Admiral

Husband E. Kimmel. Kimmel also informed Roosevelt of Pearl Harbor's

deficiencies, but accepted placement there, trusting that Washington

would notify him of any intelligence pointing to attack. This proved

to be misplaced trust. As Washington watched Japan preparing to

assault Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel, as well as his Army counterpart

in Hawaii, General Walter C. Short, were completely sealed off from

the information pipeline.

Prior Knowledge

One of the most important elements in America's foreknowledge of

Japan's intentions was our government's success in cracking Japan's

secret diplomatic code known as "Purple." Tokyo used it to communicate

to its embassies and consulates, including those in Washington and

Hawaii. The code was so complex that it was enciphered and deciphered

by machine. A talented group of American cryptoanalysts broke the code

in 1940 and devised a facsimile of the Japanese machine. These,

utilized by the intelligence sections of both the War and Navy

departments, swiftly revealed Japan's diplomatic messages. The

deciphered texts were nicknamed "Magic."

Copies of Magic were always promptly delivered in locked pouches to

President Roosevelt, and the secretaries of State, War, and Navy. They

also went to Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall and to the

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark. However, although

three Purple decoding machines were allotted to Britain, none were

sent to Pearl Harbor. Intercepts of ciphered messages radioed between

Tokyo and its Honolulu consulate had to be forwarded to Washington for

decrypting. Thus Kimmel and Short, the Hawaiian commanders, were at

the mercy of Washington for feedback. A request for their own decoding

machine was rebuffed on the grounds that diplomatic traffic was of

insufficient interest to soldiers.

How untrue that was! On October 9, 1941, the War Department decoded a

Tokyo-to-Honolulu dispatch instructing the Consul General to divide

Pearl Harbor into five specified areas and to report the exact

locations of American ships therein.

There is nothing unusual about spies watching ship movements -- but

reporting precise whereabouts of ships in dock has only one

implication. Charles Willoughby, Douglas MacArthur's chief of

intelligence later wrote that the "reports were on a grid system of

the inner harbor with coordinate locations of American men of war ...

coordinate grid is the classical method for pinpoint target

designation; our battleships had suddenly become targets." This

information was never sent to Kimmel or Short.

Additional intercepts were decoded by Washington, all within one day

of their original transmission:

* November 5th: Tokyo notified its Washington ambassadors that

November 25th was the deadline for an agreement with the U.S.

* November 11th: They were warned, "The situation is nearing a

climax, and the time is getting short."

* November 16th: The deadline was pushed up to November 29th. "The

deadline absolutely cannot be changed," the dispatch said. "After

that, things are automatically going to happen."

* November 29th (the U.S. ultimatum had now been received): The

ambassadors were told a rupture in negotiations was "inevitable,"

but that Japan's leaders "do not wish you to give the impression

that negotiations are broken off."

* November 30th: Tokyo ordered its Berlin embassy to inform the

Germans that "the breaking out of war may come quicker than anyone

dreams."

* December 1st: The deadline was again moved ahead. "[T]o prevent

the United States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been

advising the press and others that ... the negotiations are

continuing."

* December 1st-2nd: The Japanese embassies in non-Axis nations

around the world were directed to dispose of their secret

documents and all but one copy of their codes. (This was for a

reason easy to fathom -- when war breaks out, the diplomatic

offices of a hostile state lose their immunity and are normally

overtaken. One copy of code was retained so that final

instructions could be received, after which the last code copy

would be destroyed.)

An additional warning came via the so-called "winds" message. A

November 18th intercept indicated that, if a break in U.S. relations

were forthcoming, Tokyo would issue a special radio warning. This

would not be in the Purple code, as it was intended to reach

consulates and lesser agencies of Japan not equipped with the code or

one of its machines. The message, to be repeated three times during a

weather report, was "Higashi no kaze ame," meaning "East wind, rain."

"East wind" signified the United States; "rain" signified diplomatic

split -- in effect, war.

This prospective message was deemed so significant that U.S. radio

monitors were constantly watching for it, and the Navy Department

typed it up on special reminder cards. On December 4th, "Higashi no

kaze ame" was indeed broadcast and picked up by Washington

intelligence.

On three different occasions since 1894, Japan had made surprise

attacks coinciding with breaks in diplomatic relations. This history

was not lost on President Roosevelt. Secretary Stimson, describing

FDR's White House conference of November 25th, noted: "The President

said the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning

and stated that we might be attacked, say next Monday, for example."

Nor was it lost on Washington's senior military officers, all of them

War College graduates.

As Robert Stinnett has revealed, Washington was not only deciphering

Japanese diplomatic messages, but naval dispatches as well. President

Roosevelt had access to these intercepts via his routing officer,

Lieutenant Commander McCollum, who had authored the original

eight-point plan of provocation to Japan. So much secrecy has

surrounded these naval dispatches that their existence was not

revealed during any of the ten Pearl Harbor investigations, even the

mini-probe Congress conducted in 1995. Most of Stinnett's requests for

documents concerning Pearl Harbor have been denied as still

classified, even under the Freedom of Information Act.

It was long presumed that as the Japanese fleet approached Pearl

Harbor, it maintained complete radio silence. This is untrue. The

fleet barely observed discretion, let alone silence. Naval

intelligence intercepted and translated numerous dispatches, some

clearly revealing that Pearl Harbor had been targeted. The most

significant was the following, sent by Admiral Yamamoto to the

Japanese First Air Fleet on November 26, 1941:

The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret and

maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall

advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of

hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet

and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid is planned for the

dawn of x-day. Exact date to be given by later order.

So much official secrecy continues to surround the translations of the

intercepted Japanese naval dispatches that it is not known if the

foregoing message was sent to McCollum or seen by FDR. It is not even

known who originally translated the intercept. One thing, however, is

certain: The message's significance could not have been lost on the

translator.

1941 also witnessed the following:

On January 27th, our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, sent a message

to Washington stating: "The Peruvian Minister has informed a member of

my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese

source, that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United

States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack

against Pearl Harbor with all their strength...."

On November 3rd, still relying on informants, Grew notified Secretary

of State Cordell Hull: "War with the United States may come with

dramatic and dangerous suddenness." He sent an even stronger warning

on November 17th.

Congressman Martin Dies would write:

Early in 1941 the Dies Committee came into possession of a

strategic map which gave clear proof of the intentions of the

Japanese to make an assault on Pearl Harbor. The strategic map was

prepared by the Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department.

As soon as I received the document I telephoned Secretary of State

Cordell Hull and told him what I had. Secretary Hull directed me

not to let anyone know about the map and stated that he would call

me as soon as he talked to President Roosevelt. In about an hour he

telephoned to say that he had talked to Roosevelt and they agreed

that it would be very serious if any information concerning this

map reached the news services.... I told him it was a grave

responsibility to withhold such vital information from the public.

The Secretary assured me that he and Roosevelt considered it

essential to national defense.

Dusko Popov was a Yugoslav who worked as a double agent for both

Germany and Britain. His true allegiance was to the Allies. In the

summer of 1941, the Nazis ordered Popov to Hawaii to make a detailed

study of Pearl Harbor and its nearby airfields. The agent deduced that

the mission betokened a surprise attack by the Japanese. In August, he

fully reported this to the FBI in New York. J. Edgar Hoover later

bitterly recalled that he had provided warnings to FDR about Pearl

Harbor, but that Roosevelt told him not to pass the information any

further and to just leave it in his (the president's) hands.

Kilsoo Haan, of the Sino-Korean People's League, received definite

word from the Korean underground that the Japanese were planning to

assault Hawaii "before Christmas." In November, after getting nowhere

with the State Department, Haan convinced Iowa Senator Guy Gillette of

his claim's merit. Gillette briefed the president, who laconically

thanked him and said it would be looked into.

In Java, in early December, the Dutch Army decoded a dispatch from

Tokyo to its Bangkok embassy, forecasting attacks on four sites

including Hawaii. The Dutch passed the information to Brigadier

General Elliot Thorpe, the U.S. military observer. Thorpe sent

Washington a total of four warnings. The last went to General

Marshall's intelligence chief. Thorpe was ordered to send no further

messages concerning the matter. The Dutch also had their Washington

military attaché, Colonel Weijerman, personally warn General Marshall.

Captain Johann Ranneft, the Dutch naval attaché in Washington, who was

awarded the Legion of Merit for his services to America, recorded

revealing details in his diary. On December 2nd, he visited the Office

of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Ranneft inquired about the Pacific. An

American officer, pointing to a wall map, said, "This is the Japanese

Task Force proceeding East." It was a spot midway between Japan and

Hawaii. On December 6th, Ranneft returned and asked where the Japanese

carriers were. He was shown a position on the map about 300-400 miles

northwest of Pearl Harbor. Ranneft wrote: "I ask what is the meaning

of these carriers at this location; whereupon I receive the answer

that it is probably in connection with Japanese reports of eventual

American action.... I myself do not think about it because I believe

that everyone in Honolulu is 100 percent on the alert, just like

everyone here at O.N.I."

On November 29th, Secretary of State Cordell Hull secretly met with

freelance newspaper writer Joseph Leib. Leib had formerly held several

posts in the Roosevelt administration. Hull knew him and felt he was

one newsman he could trust. The secretary of state handed him copies

of some of the Tokyo intercepts concerning Pearl Harbor. He said the

Japanese were planning to strike the base and that FDR planned to let

it happen. Hull made Leib pledge to keep his name out of it, but hoped

he could blow the story sky-high in the newspapers.

Leib ran to the office of his friend Lyle Wilson, the Washington

bureau chief of United Press. While keeping his pledge to Hull, he

told Wilson the details and showed him the intercepts. Wilson replied

that the story was ludicrous and refused to run it. Through

connections, Leib managed to get a hurried version onto UP's foreign

cable, but only one newspaper carried any part of it.

After Pearl Harbor, Lyle Wilson called Leib to his office. He handed

him a copy of FDR's just-released "day of infamy" speech. The two men

wept. Leib recounted his story in the recent History Channel

documentary, "Sacrifice at Pearl Harbor."

The foregoing represents just a sampling of evidence that Washington

knew in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack. For additional evidences,

see Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath by Pulitzer Prize-winning

historian John Toland, and Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and

Pearl Harbor by Robert Stinnett.* So certain was the data that, at a

private press briefing in November 1941, General George Marshall

confidently predicted that a Japanese-American war would break out

during the "first ten days of December."

However, none of this information was passed to our commanders in

Hawaii, Kimmel and Short, with the exception of Ambassador Grew's

January warning, a copy of which reached Kimmel on February 1st. To

allay any concerns, Lieutenant Commander McCollum -- who originated

the plan to incite Japan to war -- wrote Kimmel: "Naval Intelligence

places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data

regarding the present disposition and deployment of Japanese naval and

army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned

for in the foreseeable future."

Sitting Ducks

To ensure a successful Japanese attack -- one that would enrage

America into joining the war -- it was vital to keep Kimmel and Short

out of the intelligence loop. However, Washington did far more than

this to facilitate the Japanese assault.

On November 25th, approximately one hour after the Japanese attack

force left port for Hawaii, the U.S. Navy issued an order forbidding

U.S. and Allied shipping to travel via the North Pacific. All

transpacific shipping was rerouted through the South Pacific. This

order was even applied to Russian ships docked on the American west

coast. The purpose is easy to fathom. If any commercial ship

accidentally stumbled on the Japanese task force, it might alert Pearl

Harbor. As Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, the Navy's War Plans

officer in 1941, frankly stated: "We were prepared to divert traffic

when we believed war was imminent. We sent the traffic down via the

Torres Strait, so that the track of the Japanese task force would be

clear of any traffic."

The Hawaiian commanders have traditionally been censured for failing

to detect the approaching Japanese carriers. What goes unsaid is that

Washington denied them the means to do so. An army marching overland

toward a target is easily spotted. But Hawaii is in the middle of the

ocean. Its approaches are limitless and uninhabited. During the week

before December 7th, naval aircraft searched more than two million

square miles of the Pacific -- but never saw the Japanese force. This

is because Kimmel and Short had only enough planes to survey one-third

of the 360-degree arc around them, and intelligence had advised

(incorrectly) that they should concentrate on the Southwest.

Radar, too, was insufficient. There were not enough trained

surveillance pilots. Many of the reconnaissance craft were old and

suffered from a lack of spare parts. The commanders' repeated requests

to Washington for additional patrol planes were turned down. Rear

Admiral Edward T. Layton, who served at Pearl Harbor, summed it up in

his book And I Was There: "There was never any hint in any

intelligence received by the local command of any Japanese threat to

Hawaii. Our air defenses were stripped on orders from the army chief

himself. Of the twelve B-17s on the island, only six could be kept in

the air by cannibalizing the others for spare parts."

The Navy has traditionally followed the rule that, when international

relations are critical, the fleet puts to sea. That is exactly what

Admiral Kimmel did. Aware that U.S.-Japanese relations were

deteriorating, he sent 46 warships safely into the North Pacific in

late November 1941 -- without notifying Washington. He even ordered

the fleet to conduct a mock air raid on Pearl Harbor, clairvoyantly

selecting the same launch site Admiral Yamamoto chose two weeks later.

When the White House learned of Kimmel's move it countermanded his

orders and ordered all ships returned to dock, using the dubious

excuse that Kimmel's action might provoke the Japanese. Washington

knew that if the two fleets met at sea, and engaged each other, there

might be questions about who fired the first shot.

Kimmel did not give up, however. With the exercise canceled, his

carrier chief, Vice Admiral William "Bull" Halsey, issued plans for a

25-ship task force to guard against an "enemy air and submarine

attack" on Pearl Harbor. The plan never went into effect. On November

26th, Admiral Stark, Washington's Chief of Naval Operations, ordered

Halsey to use his carriers to transport fighter planes to Wake and

Midway islands -- further depleting Pearl Harbor's air defenses.

It was clear, of course, that once disaster struck Pearl Harbor, there

would be demands for accountability. Washington seemed to artfully

take this into account by sending an ambiguous "war warning" to

Kimmel, and a similar one to Short, on November 27th. This has been

used for years by Washington apologists to allege that the commanders

should have been ready for the Japanese.

Indeed, the message began conspicuously: "This dispatch is to be

considered a war warning." But it went on to state: "The number and

equipment of Japanese troops and the organizations of naval task

forces indicates an amphibious expedition against the Philippines,

Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." None of these areas were

closer than 5,000 miles to Hawaii! No threat to Pearl Harbor was

hinted at. It ended with the words: "Continental districts, Guam,

Samoa take measures against sabotage." The message further stated that

"measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil

population." Both commanders reported the actions taken to Washington.

Short followed through with sabotage precautions, bunching his planes

together (which hinders saboteurs but makes ideal targets for

bombers), and Kimmel stepped up air surveillance and sub searches. If

their response to the "war warning" was insufficient, Washington said

nothing. The next day, a follow-up message from Marshall's adjutant

general to Short warned only: "Initiate forthwith all additional

measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments,

property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel

against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against

espionage."

Thus things stood as Japan prepared to strike. Using the Purple code,

Tokyo sent a formal statement to its Washington ambassadors. It was to

be conveyed to the American Secretary of State on Sunday, December

7th. The statement terminated relations and was tantamount to a

declaration of war. On December 6th, in Washington, the War and Navy

departments had already decrypted the first 13 parts of this 14-part

message. Although the final passage officially severing ties had not

yet come through, the fiery wording made its meaning obvious. Later

that day, when Lieutenant Lester Schulz delivered to President

Roosevelt his copy of the intercept, Schulz heard FDR say to his

advisor, Harry Hopkins, "This means war."

During subsequent Pearl Harbor investigations, both General Marshall,

Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations,

denied any recollection of where they had been on the evening of

December 6th -- despite Marshall's reputation for a photographic

memory. But James G. Stahlman, a close friend of Navy Secretary Frank

Knox, said Knox told him FDR convened a high-level meeting at the

White House that evening. Knox, Marshall, Stark, and War Secretary

Stimson attended. Indeed, with the nation on war's threshold, such a

conference only made sense. That same evening, the Navy Department

received a request from Stimson for a list of the whereabouts of all

ships in the Pacific.

On the morning of December 7th, the final portion of Japan's lengthy

message to the U.S. government was decoded. Tokyo added two special

directives to its ambassadors. The first directive, which the message

called "very important," was to deliver the statement at 1 p.m. The

second directive ordered that the last copy of code, and the machine

that went with it, be destroyed. The gravity of this was immediately

recognized in the Navy Department: Japan had a long history of

synchronizing attacks with breaks in relations; Sunday was an abnormal

day to deliver diplomatic messages -- but the best for trying to catch

U.S. armed forces at low vigilance; and 1 p.m. in Washington was

shortly after dawn in Hawaii!

Admiral Stark arrived at his office at 9:25 a.m. He was shown the

message and the important delivery time. One junior officer pointed

out the possibility of an attack on Hawaii; another urged that Kimmel

be notified. But Stark refused; he did nothing all morning. Years

later, he told the press that his conscience was clear concerning

Pearl Harbor because all his actions had been dictated by a "higher

authority." As Chief of Naval Operations, Stark had only one higher

authority: Roosevelt.

In the War Department, where the 14-part statement had also been

decoded, Colonel Rufus Bratton, head of the Army's Far Eastern

section, discerned the message's significance. But the chief of

intelligence told him nothing could be done until Marshall arrived.

Bratton tried reaching Marshall at home, but was repeatedly told the

general was out horseback riding. The horseback ride turned out to be

a long one. When Bratton finally reached Marshall by phone and told

him of the emergency, Marshall said he would come to the War

Department. Marshall took 75 minutes to make the 10-minute drive. He

didn't come to his office until 11:25 a.m. -- an extremely late hour

with the nation on the brink of war. He perused the Japanese message

and was shown the delivery time. Every officer in Marshall's office

agreed these indicated an attack in the Pacific at about 1 p.m. EST.

The general finally agreed that Hawaii should be alerted, but time was

running out.

Marshall had only to pick up his desk phone to reach Pearl Harbor on

the transpacific line. Doing so would not have averted the attack, but

at least our men would have been at their battle stations. Instead,

the general wrote a dispatch. After it was encoded it went to the

Washington office of Western Union. From there it was relayed to San

Francisco. From San Francisco it was transmitted via RCA commercial

radio to Honolulu. General Short received it six hours after the

attack. Two hours later it reached Kimmel. One can imagine their

exasperation on reading it.

Despite all the evidence accrued through Magic and other sources

during the previous months, Marshall had never warned Hawaii. To

historians -- ignorant of that classified evidence -- it would appear

the general had tried to save Pearl Harbor, "but alas, too late."

Similarly, FDR sent a last-minute plea for peace to Emperor Hirohito.

Although written a week earlier, he did not send it until the evening

of December 6th. It was to be delivered by Ambassador Grew, who would

be unable to receive an audience with the emperor before December 8th.

Thus the message could not conceivably have forestalled the attack --

but posterity would think that FDR, too, had made "a valiant, last

effort."

The Japanese strike sank or heavily damaged 18 naval vessels

(including eight battleships), destroyed 188 planes, and left over

2,000 dead. The Roberts Commission, assigned to investigate the

attack, consisted of personal cronies of Roosevelt and Marshall. The

Commission fully absolved Washington and declared that America was

caught off guard due to "dereliction of duty" by Kimmel and Short. The

wrath of America for these two was exceeded only by its wrath for

Tokyo. To this day, many believe it was negligence by the Hawaii

commanders that made the Pearl Harbor disaster possible. (See

"Scapegoating Kimmel and Short," page 20.)

* Though a major exposer of the Pearl Harbor conspiracy, Robert

Stinnett is sympathetic regarding FDR's motives. He writes in his

book: "As a veteran of the Pacific War, I felt a sense of outrage as I

uncovered secrets that had been hidden from Americans for more than

fifty years. But I understood the agonizing dilemma faced by President

Roosevelt. He was forced to find circuitous means to persuade an

isolationist America to join in a fight for freedom." In our view, a

government that is allowed to operate in such fashion is a government

that has embarked on a dangerous, slippery slope toward dictatorship.

Nonetheless, Stinnett's position on FDR's motives makes his exposé of

FDR's actions all the more compelling.

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