Sara Goering, “Gene Therapies and the Pursuit of a Better Human,” in May, Applied Ethics, 3rd ed., pp. 653-663.

 

          Goering considers issues that accompany parental decisions to engage in the genetic modification of children and attempts to apply the theory of John Rawls to such decisions. She notes that the correction of serious diseases such as Tay-Sachs or cystic fibrosis may be defensible from a Rawlsian perspective, but she finds other conditions less defensible from the cards-down (Rawlsian) perspective. Dwarfism, deafness, and homosexuality are among the conditions for which parents are likely to consider “correction” or “enhancement.”

          Goering points out that some societies assign a disvalue to specific characteristics. Such disvalue becomes a major issue in the matter of whether to engage in genetic modification. Members of the different communities—small persons, deaf individuals, and homosexuals—consider themselves as “complete” persons.

          Goering contends that with the cards down negotiators of the social contract would exclude race, sexual preference, and height as candidates for modification. Not knowing their race or sexual preference, the negotiators would not know which community they would find themselves in when the cards are turned face up (when, that is, the veil of ignorance is lifted).

          Lacking knowledge of their particular community and its values, the negotiators would exclude race, sexual preference, and height as candidates for modification. They would not know whether their community—which might be a dwarf community, a racial minority community, or a gay community—valued or disvalued a particular height, race, or sexual orientation.

          Deafness, according to Goering, is likely to be seriously considered as a candidate for modification. To account for this willingness to consider deafness, she describes an asymmetry in deafness: hearing persons are not disadvantaged in deaf societies, but deaf persons are sometimes disadvantaged in hearing communities. This “asymmetry,” as she calls it, may explain why some are likely to consider deafness as a possible candidate for genetic correction or modification.

            Goering expresses concern over such decisions based on asymmetry. She asks, for example, whether the elimination of deafness or dwarfism is a benefit or a systematic elimination of special minority populations. Goering cites a publication of the Denver Ear Institute in which deafness is considered a “birthright to a distinctive and rewarding life.”

          Goering’s moral framework is that of an autonomy contractarian. She explicitly identifies the theory of John Rawls and attempts to apply it to the specific issues of human genetic modification.