Soren Holm, “A Life in the Shadow: One Reason Why We Should Not Clone Humans,” in May, Applied Ethics, 3^rd ed., 671-674.

Holm presents what he calls “a life in the shadow” argument against the cloning of humans. He does not join those who regard human cloning as intrinsically wrong, but he looks to the likely results and offers his assessment of such a practice.

Holm contends that autonomy is an important value, but cloning deprives a person of meaningful or full autonomy. As long as the public accepts “genetic essentialism” (the belief that a person’s characteristics are largely determined by one’s genes), a practice of cloning humans will deprive a cloned subject of his or her own life—that is, it will deprive the cloned individual of an autonomous life outside the shadow of the older individual from whom the subject was cloned.

The popular acceptance of genetic essentialism is likely to lead people to have certain expectations of the cloned subjects. Comparisons with the older individual from whom the subject was cloned are likely to be drawn. The comparisons will ordinarily be made to approve or disapprove of the direction the clone’s life is taking—depending on the contributions or harm done by the individual from whom the subject was cloned. Such comparisons are likely to deprive clones of “a life of their own.”

Holm places autonomy at the center of his moral analysis of human cloning. This standard or measure of right action is defended by autonomy contractarians.